On Wednesday, 18 February 2026, what had been speculated about for months finally happened: Poland 2050 of Szymon Hołownia ceased to exist in its previous form. A group of 18 parliamentarians – including Minister of Climate and Environment Paulina Hennig-Kloska, Ryszard Petru, Aleksandra Leo, Mirosław Suchoń and a dozen others – left the party and announced the creation of a new parliamentary club called Centrum. This is not a minor split. It is the end of a project that, just three years ago, was meant to be a fresh, centrist breeze in Polish politics.
From the perspective of an observer who has followed the Polish scene for years, this moment is not surprising, but it hurts. Poland 2050 was born on a wave of enthusiasm around Hołownia – a charismatic speaker who promised politics without hate, without extremes, with an emphasis on competence and the future. Today this same project is falling apart before our eyes, only a few months after Hołownia lost the presidential election and handed the reins to Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz. The internal conflict proved stronger than the shared vision. One faction wants to be a loyal supporter of Donald Tusk, the other wants to retain independence and a centrist profile. The result? Two clubs instead of one, and a sense that the dream of a „third way” has just ended.
The new formation, Centrum, declares that it wants to be a place of compromise and pragmatism. Hennig-Kloska stresses that it is a space where „people meet and work out good solutions”. It sounds lovely, but in Polish politics such declarations are rarely enough. Petru is returning to the game after years away, and Leo and others bring experience – this could be an interesting mix. The only question is whether Centrum can build a broader base outside the Sejm, or whether it will remain a parliamentary club without a real grassroots organisation.
And what about the 15 October coalition? Prime Minister Donald Tusk has already moved to calm things down: both sides – Pełczyńska-Nałęcz as well as Hennig-Kloska – assured him of their loyalty to the government. The parliamentary majority is expected to last until the 2027 elections. In theory, everything holds together. In practice, however, the collapse of Poland 2050 is a serious blow to the coalition structure. The Third Way (which was, after all, an alliance of Poland 2050 and PSL) is losing cohesion. PSL remains, but without a strong centrist partner it becomes more exposed to pressure. The Left gains somewhat, as a weaker centrist flank means KO will have to pay more attention to its demands. And this in turn may generate new tensions.
Could the government fall apart? In the coming months, probably not. Tusk has experience in holding coalitions together from much worse materials. Both new groups need stability so as not to vanish in the polls. Renegotiating the coalition agreement is, however, inevitable – mandates, posts, influence over ministries. This will be a real test. If Centrum starts acting independently and the remnants of Poland 2050 feel marginalised, the cracks may deepen. One bigger crisis – budgetary, European or related to judicial reform – is all it would take for the fragile balance to collapse.
In my opinion this is not merely an internal matter of one party. It is a symptom of a broader problem of Polish centrist politics: the difficulty of maintaining cohesion when a leader loses momentum and personal ambitions take precedence over the programme. Hołownia built a movement on charisma, but not on strong structures. We see the effects today. Poland needs a strong, rational centre – not as decoration, but as a brake against extremes. Will Centrum fill this gap, or only deepen it? Time will tell.
One thing is certain: Polish politics has just become a little more dynamic and – unfortunately – more unpredictable. The 15 October coalition will survive, but it will never be the same again. And we, the voters, have received another lesson that no party is eternal. Even those that started with the greatest credit of trust.





